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Articles
A Judge’s Perspective on Perspectives
Courses: Three Suggested Rubrics . . .
with Examples
The Honorable Stephen J. Fortunato, Jr. 1

“[I]t is not enough for a man to be good; he must be good for
something.”
—John Dewey2
“The great human societies are the creation not of profiteers,
but of dreamers.”
—Rabindranath Tagore 3
I. INTRODUCTION

The objective of the legal system is to do justice, a succinct
1. Associate Justice, Rhode Island Superior Court (ret.); Adjunct
Professor, Roger Williams University School of Law. provjust@cox.net. I am
grateful for the comments and encouragement of David Logan and Carl
Bogus, Dean and Professor respectively, at the Roger Williams University
School of Law. The research and observations of Maura Clancy, School of Law
’14, were invaluable. Naturally, any mistakes are mine alone.
2. JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PHILOSPOHY OF EDUCATION 417 (Paul Monroe, Macmillian 1922) (1916).
3. RABINDRANATH TAGORE, THE ENGLISH WRITINGS OF RABINDRANATH
TAGORE VOLUME FOUR: ESSAYS 697 (Atlantic Publishers and Distributors
2007).
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precept easy to recall but problematic to define as a course of
behavior. If the animating principle of the rule of law were lodged
in the quip by the early twentieth century legal scholar Zechariah
Chafee as the desire “to settle a dispute between two persons
without physical conflict,” 4 then statistics about cases filed and
disposed would supply the key to measuring success and failure.
This is far from the full story, however, and the imperative
charging the profession to do justice insistently both provokes and
challenges.
Indeed, one part of the nation’s legal apparatus is
denominated as the criminal justice system and in popular
discussions, references to “our system of justice” and the cries to
“bring whoever did this heinous crime to justice” by prosecutors,
editorialists, and lay persons are common. Oaths administered to
the principal custodians of the judicial system, the lawyers and
the judges, require solemn promises to support and faithfully
interpret the venerable and venerated documents that define,
albeit with some mischievous imprecision, the fundamental
principles of our system of ordered liberty and “to administer
justice without respect to persons.” 5 Moreover, judges on some
courts are called “Justices,” as if their very beings are infused with
traits associated with a dispassionate search for the goals of
sagacity, probity, and fairness.
Other declarations within the law, less esteemed than
constitutions but nevertheless crucially important to lawyers and
litigants, also mandate that judges and lawyers in the midst of a
trial recognize that justice is their ultimate quest. For example,
the preamble to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure commands
that the Rules shall be “construed and administered to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.” 6
Similar directives are found in the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence as well as their
counterpart rules in every state. Indeed, the most quoted jurist in
American history, 7 Benjamin Cardozo, wrote in his classic The
4. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of
Evidence in Trials at Common Law, 37 HARV. L. REV. 513, 519 (1924) (book
review).
5. See 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2006).
6. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
7. RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION (Univ. of
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Nature of the Judicial Process of the judicial responsibility to be
alert to persistent demands to maximize “social welfare,” under
which are subsumed considerations of justice: “[I]ts demands are
those of religion or of ethics or of the social sense of justice,
whether formulated in creed or system, or immanent in the
common mind.” 8
The centrality of doing justice as the driving force within the
legal profession, whether honored more in its breach than
otherwise, was a prime motivating force behind the drafting of the
Carnegie Report, Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the
Profession of Law 9 (hereinafter “the Carnegie Report”) which
today shapes the focus of the proponents of law school reform.
“Doing justice” is a recurring theme throughout the two hundred
pages of text as its authors seek to demonstrate how law schools
may better prepare persons entering the profession to answer a
question the authors believe attorneys should regularly ask
themselves: “Does the responsibility to pursue substantive justice
in individual cases and to consider the broader impact of one’s
actions conflict with the advocacy on behalf of one’s client?” 10
Of course, the prevalence of the term “justice” within and
without the legal profession is no guarantee that students
entering law school will have more than a superficial awareness of
its multiple meanings and provenances. The parameters of
justice, both reparative and distributive, have stimulated tomes
over the centuries, written by luminaries from Plato and Aristotle,
to Thomas Aquinas and Leibnitz, to John Locke and John Stuart
Mill, down to John Rawls, Richard Posner, and Ronald Dworkin,
and this is only the short list. However, most students entering
law school have little or no familiarity with these thinkers and
their analyses; and under the traditional law school curriculum,
they will not become any more familiar with these thinkers unless
some professor randomly interjects them. Though the Carnegie
Report repeatedly lobbies for the primacy of professional
Chicago Press 1993) (1990).
8. BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 72 (Yale
Univ. Press 1991) (1921).
9. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ANNE COLBY, JUDITH WELCH WEGNER, LLOYD
BOND & LEE S. SHULMAN, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE
PROFESSION OF LAW (2007) [hereinafter Carnegie Report].
10. Id. at 131.
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responsibility and ethical behavior, it does not note this
substantive intellectual deficit or its causes.
Law students are bright, earnest, and enthusiastic, but the
paucity of their pre-law school preparation in the humanities can
be proved both anecdotally and empirically. Consequently, law
schools have more of a task than simply to teach basic legal
doctrine and technique supplemented with some clinical
experience: they must remedy a deficit in the humanities as they
simultaneously seek to restore the more noble values to what
some identified as a troubled profession long before the Carnegie
Report was published. 11
Law school deans and professors are aware of this challenge –
call it an obligation if you will—and have been addressing it in
various permutations for several decades, even longer at some
institutions. Innovative programs in the 1960s and ‘70s sent
second- and third-year students into the field to work at
everything from poverty law clinics to anti-smoking foundations to
Selective Service reform organizations and into seminars that
offered elective credits in courses ranging from Chinese Law to
Law and Literature; these programs developed on an ad hoc basis
depending on the interest and motivation of individual professors
and deans at various law schools,12 as well as pressure from
socially engaged students in some instances.
Seminars were part of the curriculum at many schools long
before the Carnegie Institute decided to scrutinize legal
professional education. For decades, the seminar has allowed
11. See, e.g., Carl T. Bogus, The Death of An Honorable Profession, 71
IND. L.J. 911 (1996); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING
IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (Harvard Univ. Press 2001) (1993).
12. This approach by these deans and professors is consonant with the
American Bar Association Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of
Law Schools and Admissions to the Bar Standard 3-302, which provide that
law schools shall offer “substantial opportunities” for “instruction in . . . the
history, goals, structure, values, rules and responsibilities of the legal
profession and its members,” for “seminars, directed, research, small classes,
and collaborative work” and for “live-client or other real-life practice
experiences, appropriately supervised and designed to encourage reflection by
students on their experiences and on the values and responsibilities of the
legal profession.” American Bar Association Standards and Rules of
Procedure for Approval of Law Sch., available at http://www.americanbar.org
/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/Standards/2013_2014_sta
ndards_chapter3.authcheckdam.pdf
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students, usually in their second and third years, to study a
traditional subject in greater depth or to explore a topic,
sometimes an esoteric one, outside the core curriculum. Indeed,
the
seminar—and
a
related
teaching
modality,
the
apprenticeship—have been part of the training of lawyers and
advocates at least since the age of Pericles. Socrates and Aristotle
gathered small groups around them to teach—by the Socratic
Method, of course—rhetoric, logic and other skills associated with
the art of persuasion. Their substantive curriculum covered a host
of topics, not the least of which was the practice of civic virtue.13
So by 2007, when the Carnegie Endowment published its muchdiscussed tractate urging the reform of legal education through
increasing the number of clinical courses and the exposure of
students to mentoring by practicing professionals, all to be carried
out with constant reference to ethical responsibilities, it was yet
another vindication of the famous pronouncement by the author of
the Book of Ecclesiastes that there is nothing new under the
sun. 14
A random search of law school course lists available on the
Internet shows that at least a dozen schools refer to those usually
one- or two-credit, limited-enrollment classes as “Perspectives”
courses. This is an apt appellation as the purpose of these courses
is to afford the student an opportunity to approach a topic from
non-conventional viewpoints and with materials that do not place
the decisions of appellate courts at center stage. Among the
schools choosing this designation are Cornell, Notre Dame, and
William and Mary; some schools add a word or two to their
seminar offerings, so, for example, at the University of Minnesota,
these courses are referenced as “Perspectives on the Law.” But
however they are denoted, they exist at all schools as supplements
to the core doctrinal courses and the other courses, such as
Bankruptcy Law, which are taught by lecture to large groups of
students. Advocating that some of these “Perspectives” seminars
be required as either compliments to, or prerequisites for,
enrollment in some of the clinical offerings, this essay suggests
13. See CARL J. RICHARD, THE FOUNDERS AND THE CLASSICS: GREECE,
ROME, AND THE AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT (Harvard Univ. Press 1995)
(1994).
14. Ecclesiastes 1:9.
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that the failure to use these courses to their maximum
effectiveness is one vice of the legal curricula at many schools.
The Carnegie Report was received by law schools as a
summons to act self-consciously and collaboratively 15 to address
the problems besetting the legal profession by improving the
training of new lawyers. Whatever its shortcomings, whether it is
a repetitive bureaucratese, few specific suggestions, or a dearth of
cogent commentary by judges and seasoned attorneys as to what
they see in practice, the Carnegie Report is considered an
influential critique of the current problems within legal education,
and its observations have resonated throughout the law school
community.
Law schools are now reexamining the role of clinical
programs, how they monitor and provide constructive feedback
other than a final exam grade to their students, and how the more
elevated values of the profession may be transmitted by
integrating them into the entire academic experience. In fairness,
it must be noted that the authors of the Carnegie Report did not
claim to reach their conclusions at a conclave on some Parnassian
height but acknowledged earlier efforts to move in the directions
they recommend by law schools at the City University of New
York, New York University and Yale.16
As every law school dean is aware, the thesis of the Carnegie
Report is simple and direct: law schools are turning out graduates
who know doctrines of the law’s major topics and branches as
enunciated in appellate decisions, but they know little about how
to draft elementary pleadings or find the way to the courthouse,
and once there, they do not have a clue as to what to do by way of
filing the papers or arguing the simplest of motions to a judge.
15. In fact, a consortium of ten law schools was assembled in 2009, two
years after the publication of the Carnegie Report, to “promote thoughtful
innovation in law school curricul[a]” and to implement the legal education
reform called for in the Carnegie Report; the consortium named themselves
the Legal Education Analysis and Reform Network, or LEARN. See Legal
Education Analysis and Reform Network (LEARN), General Description of
Planned Projects 2009–2010, at 10, available at http://www.albanylaw.edu
/media/user/celt/learnprojects.pdf [hereinafter LEARN Proposal]. Although
one of LEARN’s stated project proposals was to create a website—not only for
the purposes of identifying their organization and mission, but also to offer a
“rich collection of teaching resources” to legal educators—no such website has
yet come to fruition. See id. at 16–17.
16. Carnegie Report, supra note 9, at 43–44, 119–20.
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Worse, the Carnegie Report maintains that the newly minted
lawyers are ignorant of ethical and professional responsibilities
and consider that their only moral mandate is to wage a zealous
crusade on behalf of their client. Considerations of justice are few
or nonexistent, and in any event are suspended while the student
devotes herself to learning legal doctrine and “how to think like a
lawyer.” 17
To rectify this sorry state, the Carnegie Report recommends
increased clinical education that will expose the student to a
variety of real-life clients with controversies placed before real-life
courts and administrative tribunals. The Carnegie Report’s
authors opt for “an integrative strategy for legal education” 18 in
which the “more effective way to teach is to keep the analytical
and the moral, the procedural and the substantive in dialogue
throughout the process of learning the law.” 19
This bland and benign generalization characterizes the
Carnegie Report’s critique, as does a paucity of concrete
recommendations, so the profession was delivered a call to arms
but furnished little in the way of ammunition. But a platitudinous
(even if they are well-meaning and occasionally helpful platitudes)
bureaucratese is not the only shortcoming of the Carnegie Report.
Of the Carnegie Report’s five co-authors, only one, Judith
Welch Wegner, has any background in the law, and hers has been
primarily as an academic and a law school dean, 20 with little or no
17. Id. at 51–54, 187.
18. Id. at 191.
19. Id. at 142.
20. Id. at ix–x. William Sullivan is a former philosophy professor and
serves as the co-director of the Carnegie Foundation’s Preparations for the
Professions Program, with research experience in identifying distinct
practices in professional education. Int’l Conference on the Future of Legal
Educ.: Conference Participants, GEORGIA STATE U. COLLEGE OF LAW,
http://law.gsu.edu/events/index/FoLE/speakers?name=sullivan (last visited
Nov. 14, 2013). Anne Colby is a developmental psychologist, a professor at
Stanford University, and formerly the director of Harvard’s Murray Research
Center and a Senior Scholar at the Carnegie Foundation. Stanford Ctr. on
Adolescence, STANFORD GRADUATE SCH. OF EDUC., http://coa.stanford.edu/
people/anne-colby (last visited Sept. 13, 2012). Judith Welch Wegner is
former dean of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Law School,
with professional experience as law clerk, attorney-advisor, appellate
attorney for the United States Department of Justice, and special assistant to
United States Secretary of Education Shirley M. Hufstedler. Faculty and
Research: Judith Welch Wegner, U. NORTH CAROLINA SCH. OF LAW, http://
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background in the court room, where lawyering skills, or a lack
thereof, are always on display.
Her fellow authors have
backgrounds in sociology, psychology, and educational theory but
none has a biography that includes any examination of the
cultural, political, or practical dimensions of the judicial system.
Though the authors spent time visiting a number of law schools,
where they observed classes and spoke to students and professors,
there is no indication that they watched any trials or learned
about the current caliber of advocacy from those most
appropriately positioned to observe it, trial and appellate judges.
Moreover, clients could also provide rich insights about how
lawyers had represented their interests, but this cohort was also
overlooked. 21
In any event, the Carnegie Report’s integrative model
requires that at different points during their law school careers,
small groups of students should be supervised and mentored by
professors and instructors with appropriate doctrinal and
experiential credentials. It is difficult to disagree with the
www.law.unc.edu/faculty/directory/wegnerjudithwelch/ (last visited Nov. 14,
2013). Lloyd Bond is a professor at the University of North CarolinaGreensboro, with research interests that include psychological and
educational measurement and the measurement of teaching ability, and has
served as a Fellow of the American Psychological Association, a Carnegie
Foundation Senior Scholar, and various other scientific committees. Lloyd
Bond Named as Carnegie Senior Scholar, CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, http://www.carnegiefoundation.org/pressreleases/lloyd-bond-named-carnegie-senior-scholar (last modified Sept. 2002).
Lee Shulman served as the eighth President Emeritus of the Carnegie
Foundation, with professional experience as a professor of educational
psychology and a researcher of teacher and teaching education, cognitive
processes of medical problem solving, and studies of medical reasoning.
Academic Symposium Keynote Speaker: Lee S. Shulman, UNIV. OF VIRGINIA,
http://www.virginia.edu/inauguration/shulman.html (last visited Sept. 13,
2012).
21. Naturally, locating a sampling of clients and then getting them to
comment may prove difficult, but those in high-profile cases might be
forthcoming as would those who were acquitted after a criminal trial; and
perhaps their less fortunate colleagues sitting in jail after sentencing might
have something to contribute. Needless to say, results would undoubtedly
create bias one way or the other, but even clients with adverse outcomes
could provide insight on their attorneys’ zeal for the case and concern for
them as people. As Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. said, “even a dog distinguishes
between being stumbled over and being kicked.” OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,
JR., THE COMMON LAW 3 (Stuart E. Thiel & David Widger eds., trans., 2013)
(1881).

FORTUNATOFINALWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

3/2/2014 10:02 AM

PERSPECTIVE ON PERSPECTIVE COURSES

9

Carnegie Report’s theme that doctrinal courses should be
complimented with practical clinical experiences and that law and
lawyering should be placed within the context of moral
responsibilities to clients with concrete legal problems and
undergirded with an abiding awareness of the integrity required
of each participant in the legal system.
Clinics, standing alone as vocational training workshops, will
not fit the bill. As Professor Carl Bogus observed a decade before
the publication of the Carnegie Report, clinics, or skills courses,
unaccompanied by substantive explorations, do not equip the
student for responsible conduct. “It is all too easy for the law to
slide into formalism or place too great an emphasis on technique,”
he warned.22
Skeptics, of course, would say that because the clinical
experience will necessarily be confined to, for example, a law
student representing an individual with a minor problem in front
of a low-level administrative tribunal or court, no skills will be
gained that could not be picked up after graduation during the
first four months of actual practice with a law firm or at a
government agency. The rejoinder to this criticism is that the
close supervision and the dialectic with the professor and other
students and the value gained from that interaction, will not be
found at the average firm or agency.
II. THE STUDENTS’ HUMANITIES DEFICIT

Any generalization about a group as large and diverse as the
law school student population is subject to criticism by
demonstrating the existence of plentiful exceptions to the general
assertion. Law schools admit academic stars, some with advanced
degrees in everything from philosophy to comparative literature to
engineering, as well as mature students a number of years out of
college who have experience in such fields as journalism, teaching,
law enforcement and community organizing. But if my encounters
– and those of fellow law professors – with law students constitute
a barometer, the students lack an awareness of their own culture,
both high and popular, as well the ethical dimensions of legal,
social, and political issues, and the philosophical and historical
ideas that must be referenced in attempts to solve them. Thus,
22.

See Bogus, supra note 11, at 944.
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remediation may be in order.
During my twenty-four years in trial and appellate practice
and my thirteen years as a trial judge in a court of general
jurisdiction, I regularly used the service of law clerks that were
enrolled in law schools. Their research services were invariably
helpful, but through discussions with them, it became clear to me
that, through no fault of their own, high schools and colleges had
failed to give them a broad grounding in the humanities and
therefore the development of the critical, analytical and forensic
skills generally associated with such study had been stunted.
A couple of examples stand out. A young woman who had
graduated from one of the original Seven Sister colleges with a
major in American literature did not know of the existence of
Allen Ginsberg or any of the Beats. Whatever one’s opinion of the
output of this group of renegade poets and novelists, surely a
student of American literature should have been exposed to them?
Another student, who I employed to assist on research for a book
review about an anti-war activist, had graduated from one of the
United States service academies and then spent more than a
decade in the military before entering law school and yet, he had
never taken a course on the Vietnam War, 23 nor had he studied it
in any depth in a survey course in military history.
In short, the majority of people entering law school, like the
majority of their fellow college graduates, have an inadequate
foundation in the humanities. This is a fact that professors and
administrators at the nation’s colleges and universities have
bemoaned for at least the past ten years, and some prescient
Cassandras sounded the alarm about this unfolding phenomenon

23. He reported that one was not offered at the academy he attended,
and to this day there is no such course listed in the curriculum. To date, the
United States Naval Academy and the United States Air Force Academy offer
limited courses (perhaps one or two) that cover topics related to the Viet Nam
War, and the United States Military Academy does not offer any history
courses (whether military history or American history) which focus on issues
raised by the Viet Nam War. See United States Naval Academy, Course
Information, US NAVAL ACADAMY COURSES, http://www.usna.edu/acdean/
courses/all_courses.html; United States Air Force Academy, Curriculum
Handbook
(2009),
http://www.usafa.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD090508-044.pdf; United States Military Academy, Curriculum and Course
Discriptions, ACADEMIC PROGRAM, http://www.usma.edu/curriculum/RedBook/
AY13_RedBook.pdf.
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even earlier. 24 These critiques range from memoirs to screeds to
dispassionate analyses scrutinizing the economic disparities
among university departments engendered by government grant
policies, which favor the applied sciences and marginalize the
humanities. But the conclusions are all the same: humanities
departments get short shrift with funding and students get shortchanged when it comes to acquiring a familiarity with the canon of
world literature, or to use Matthew Arnold’s oft-quoted phrase,
“the best which has been thought and said in the world. . .” 25 Of
course, the students also rarely see out humanities courses as the
pressures on them from their schools, their families, and their own
looming debt is to take “practical” courses and pursue a vocational
program.
The consensus of the critics is that the greatest problems are
at second- and third-tier institutions, not at the handful of elite,
well-endowed colleges and universities, though at these more
esteemed venues the humanities are placed before the student as
a smorgasbord with little structure or coherence. Hacker and
Dreifus collate the available data in their narrative and also
illustrate their conclusions with charts: “English now attracts only
half the majors it did in the mid-1960s, while history and foreign
languages and literature have even fewer survivors.” 26 An
accompanying chart shows that for every one thousand bachelor’s
degrees awarded between 1968 and 2008, the number of
vocational majors has jumped from 498 to 642, with a concomitant
decline in liberal arts concentrations, e.g., degrees awarded in the
social sciences declined from 191 to 108 and those in the
24. See, e.g., ANDREW DELBANCO, COLLEGE: WHAT IT WAS, IS, AND SHOULD
BE (2012); ANDREW HACKER & CLAUDIA DREIFUS, HIGHER EDUCATION?: HOW
COLLEGES ARE WASTING OUR MONEY AND FAILING OUR KIDS—AND WHAT WE
CAN DO ABOUT IT (Times Books 2010); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, NOT FOR PROFIT:
WHY DEMOCRACY NEEDS THE HUMANITIES (Princeton Univ. Press 2010); ELLEN
SCHRECKER, THE LOST SOUL OF HIGHER EDUCATION: CORPORATIZATION, THE
ASSAULT ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM, AND THE END OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
(2010); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, EDUCATION’S END: WHY OUR COLLEGES AND
UNIVERSITIES HAVE GIVEN UP ON THE MEANING OF LIFE (Caravan Books 2007);
STANLEY ARONOWITZ, THE KNOWLEDGE FACTORY: DISMANTLING THE CORPORATE
UNIVERSITY AND CREATING TRUE HIGHER LEARNING (2000); ALVIN B. KERNAN,
IN PLATO’S CAVE (Yale University Press 1999).
25. MATTHEW ARNOLD, CULTURE AND ANARCHY 5 (Yale University Press
1964) (1869).
26. HACKER & DREIFUS, supra note 24, at 99.
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humanities from 115 to 86. 27
For Arnold as well as current champions of the humanities in
today’s culture wars, the great ideas embodied in classic works of
literature are worthy of study because of their intrinsic value and
the pleasure and enlightenment they bring to the student.
Beyond this, there are also important ancillary reasons for
becoming conversant with the canon.
Matthew Arnold himself believed such study would help the
individual move toward spiritual perfection. One of the twentieth
century’s most important proponents of the necessity of studying
the classics, or Great Books, gave a more utilitarian cast
regarding purpose. Robert M. Hutchins, who just before the
middle of the past century served as Professor and Dean of the
Yale Law School and later as President of the University of
Chicago, noted that occupations were not simply about performing
specific tasks but existed within “moral, social, scientific, and
intellectual contexts.” 28 Thus, the purpose of education was to
prepare the student to work for societal reform rather than to
simply learn guidelines for social adjustment and conformity. 29
Which works of literature should constitute the canon is but
one of the questions for educators seeking a relevant curriculum.
Then there is the related question of the existence of sub-canons;
not long ago the Journal of Legal Education made its pages
available to a forum that posed the question as to whether there
was a legal canon. 30
The offerings provided a display of
intellectual firepower and wit by such luminaries as Stanley Fish,
Derrick Bell and Cass Sunstein but little of substance was
27. Id. at 100. See also U.S. Department of Education, Fast Facts,
NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts
/display.asp?id=37 (last visited Sept. 27, 2013) (figures collated from U.S.
Department of Education research by the National Center for Education
Statistics, which show that of the 1,650,000 bachelor’s degrees conferred in
2009–10, 358,000 were for majors in business, more than twice as many as
the 173,000 awarded to social science and history majors).
28. ROBERT M. HUTCHINS, THE GREAT CONVERSATION: THE SUBSTANCE OF
A LIBERAL EDUCATION 11–12 (Britannica Great Books 1952).
29. Id.
30. See Derrick A. Bell, Multiple Cultures and the Law: Do We Have a
Legal Canon?, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1993); Stanley Fish, Not of an Age, But
for All Time: Canons and Postmodernism, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 11 (1993)
[hereinafter Fish, Not of an Age]; Cass R. Sunstein, In Defense of Liberal
Education, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 22 (1993).
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suggested about any cases or treatises that should be included in
such a canon. And for some there are the wider questions of
whether the study of the great works of Western—or world—
culture should be offered to all or to just to the gifted, and whether
such a pursuit has any value to either the individual or the larger
community. 31
For Stanley Fish, the lawyer and literary critic, “[t]he
humanities are their own good,” but “[t]o the question ‘of what use
are the humanities? the only honest answer is none
whatsoever’.” 32 As for canons of any type, Fish, who describes
himself as “characteristically perverse,” 33 proclaims, “they
function not to encourage thought, but to stop it. Canonical
materials, when they are exerting their full force, draw a line in
the sand, but with an air suggesting that the sand is a monument
of steel.” 34 Katha Pollitt, the columnist and social critic, endorses
the study of what most literate people would agree are the
classics, but joins with Fish in her skepticism that any benefit
from them outside of personal pleasure is dubious: “But is there
any list of a few dozen books that can have . . . a magical effect, for
good or for ill? Of course not.” 35
Surely Thomas Jefferson, John Dewey, and a host of others
who have linked the survival of democracy to an educated
citizenry would disagree with the crabbed notions of Fish and
Pollitt about the value of the humanities, even though the
advocates of such study might disagree as to what works merit
inclusion in the canon. One interested in the law would have to be
comatose not to be stimulated by Aristotle or H. L. A. Hart, or a
31. See The Heart of the Matter, AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS &
SCIENCES: COMMISSION ON THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES (June 19,
2013), available at http://www.humanitiescommission.org/_pdf/hss_report.pdf
(the most recent governmental and establishmentarian endorsement of
humanities studies—for kindergarten through college). The Carnegie
Report’s subtitle, “The Humanities and Social Sciences: for a vibrant
competitive, and secure nation,” reveals the authors’ utilitarian objectives for
such pursuits. See id.
32. Stanley Fish, Will the Humanities Save Us?, N.Y. TIMES: THE
OPINION PAGES (Jan. 6, 2008, 5:31 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com
/2008/01/06/will-the-humanities-save-us/.
33. Fish, Not of an Age, supra note 30, at 12.
34. Id.
35. Katha Pollitt, Why We Read: Canon to the Right of Me, REASONABLE
CREATURES 16, 24 (Vintage Paperback 1995) (1994).
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reading of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnett 36 or
Miranda v. Arizona.37
The authors of canonical texts have never required a slavish
agreement by students or other readers, nor would any
responsible teacher do so. Contrary to Fish’s assertion that the
canon stifles inquiry, it stimulates it. Robert Hutchins had it
right when he said of the canon: “What makes them great is,
among other things, that they teach you something every time you
read them. Every time, you see something you had not seen
before[.]” 38 Of course, revering the humanities is not enough; as
the educational reformer Jonathan Kozol points out: humanists,
to make their studies serve the community, must leave their
libraries and “ . . . participate in unfamiliar, openly political, and
therefore highly dangerous assaults upon societal injustice . . . ” 39
As if the notion that exposing students to great histories,
poems, or philosophical disquisitions serves no purpose other than
the pleasure of reading them were not enough to give pause when
considering curriculum reform, one of the authors of the Carnegie
Report has questioned whether the clinical training, which it so
strenuously promotes, has any correlation with successful
performance as a lawyer. Two years after the Carnegie Report
was released, Judith Welch Wegner, the only co-author with legal
training, wrote: “[I]t is unclear whether effectiveness in practice
correlates with course work (including skills related courses and
clinical participation).” 40
So with a tentativeness about outcomes on the part of some
reputable scholars regarding the efficacy of programs of study
they themselves endorse to improve society generally and the
legal profession in particular, deans and professors seeking to
design a relevant and reformative curriculum have little choice
but to rely heavily upon their own observations and experiences as
well as their encounters with lawyers and judges active in the
profession. This would naturally include reflections about the
lawyer as not only a counselor and advocate but as a proponent
36. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
37. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
38. HUTCHINS, supra note 28, at 75.
39. JONATHAN KOZOL, ILLITERATE AMERICA 170 (Doubleday 1985).
40. Judith Welch Wegner, Response: More Complicated Than We Think,
59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 623, 636 (2010) (emphasis added).
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and champion of democratic values in the community.
From my experience as a lawyer and judge, I can say
anecdotally that I encountered stellar performances (in court and
at the negotiation or deposition table) ten percent of the time,
competent lawyering eighty percent of the time, and blundering
bordering on malpractice in the remaining ten percent. The most
capable attorneys came from every tier of law school and from
diverse backgrounds. I had no way of knowing who went home at
night, put on Bach’s cello concertos, and curled up with
Montaigne, Swift, or The Federalist. I do know, however, as
anyone interested can verify, that those universally considered
titans of the American legal profession – Thomas Jefferson and
James Madison, John Marshall, Abraham Lincoln, Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Louis Brandeis, Benjamin Cardozo, Earl Warren, and
Thurgood Marshall – read widely and voraciously.
It is beyond the scope of this essay to recite the numerous
plaints about higher education found in the books I have adverted
to any more than it is my purpose to design a comprehensive
model law school curriculum. But for those of us entrusted with
the training of aspirants to the legal profession, it is incumbent to
know what intellectual foundation most of our students are
bringing to law school and how familiar they are with the
humanities tradition of which the legal system has been a part for
centuries. Sadly, the answer for the latter question is, “Not very.”
Additionally, it is important for us to reflect on what subjects and
values we wish to inculcate beyond technical skills, even though
many students themselves would state their goal is no loftier than
to obtain admission into a profession that provides prestige and an
opportunity for financial reward.
III. LAW SCHOOLS AND THE LAWYERS THEY WISH TO MOLD

It is of course easier to determine the background an entering
student presents upon arrival at law school than it is to design
courses that will enhance the law school experience and create
competent and ethical, if not superlative, lawyers by
supplementing the core doctrinal courses and others oriented
toward preparation for the bar exam and the inculcation of basic
skills. Thus, to answer the question of what the preferred and
most beneficial non-core studies, or perspectives courses, should
be, it is preliminarily necessary for the law school to have a vision
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of who, or what, the aspiring lawyers should be upon graduation.
We know that for stand-up comedians and cocktail party
cynics, lawyers are sharks and bottom-feeders, but this is clearly
not the composite any responsible dean or law professor wishes to
create. For Anthony Kronman, a former dean of the Yale Law
School, regardless of what some lawyers have done to warrant the
pejorative appellations bestowed on them by comedians, lawyers
should be groomed to wear the mantel of statesmen. 41 Or, if a
gender-neutral term is preferred, their calling must be that of
diplomats with a high-minded and socially-conscious portfolio.
Fifty years before Dean Kronman’s call for the profession to save
its collective soul, two other distinguished Yale law professors,
Harold Laswell and Meyers McDougal urged another elevated role
for the lawyer, that of policy-maker. 42
Laswell and McDougal were not envisioning this role for
every car accident case or every misdemeanor prosecution, though
it is not difficult to imagine cases in these categories that require
resolutions demanding more than technical skills. The two
authors were also not confining the term policy-maker to cabinetlevel positions in federal, state or local government. Rather, for
them, lawyers who make policy, or counsel policy-makers, are
everywhere, on stages grand and small, public and private.
It should need no emphasis that the lawyer is today, even
when not himself a “maker” of policy, the indispensible adviser of
every responsible policy-maker of our society—whether we speak
of the head of a government department or agency, of the
executive of a corporation or labor union, of the secretary of a
trade or other private association, or even of the humble
independent enterpriser or professional man. As such an adviser,
when advising his policy-maker of what he can or cannot legally
do is, as policy-makers often complain, in an unassailably
strategic position to influence, if not create, policy. 43
The ubiquity of lawyers that Laswell and McDougal noted in
1943 obtains even more so today, and contemporary social and
political conditions invite the same question the professors raised
41. KRONMAN, supra note 11.
42. Harold D. Laswell & Meyers S. McDougal, Legal Education and
Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203,
208 (1943).
43. Id. at 208–09.

FORTUNATOFINALWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

3/2/2014 10:02 AM

PERSPECTIVE ON PERSPECTIVE COURSES

17

when they wondered “. . .whether the lawyer can be held
responsible for the plight in which we find ourselves.” 44 And the
answer we give today is unfortunately no different from the one
they supplied: “most assuredly, yes.” 45
Lawyers are everywhere. They regularly occupy elective and
appointive offices from the White House to zoning boards and
school committees or are available to provide counsel to these
same officials. Lawyers advise corporations and banks, including
ones that pollute air and rivers and drive individuals and
communities over financial cliffs. And lawyers supplied the legal
and moral underpinning, such as it was, for the embrace by the
United States government of torture as a weapon in its foreign
policy. 46 For many of us in the profession, it was anything but
uplifting to read of a United States Supreme Court Justice, one
Antonin Scalia, musing on the political necessity and
constitutional propriety of sometimes forcibly removing finger
nails from a defenseless prisoner. 47
All is not unremittingly grim, however. Intrepid and
courageous lawyers, including some serving in the military, have
exposed the depredations of two presidential administrations
waging the so-called War on Terror and continually fight for the
principles of due process to be applied on behalf of those scorned
(or ignored) by the majority. Whenever challenges are mounted to
improve the plight of the homeless, the racially marginalized, the
addicted, the undocumented and the generally neglected, lawyers
can be found collecting facts, writing briefs, and pounding on the
courthouse door for redress.
Lawyers involved in these matters, and in many others
involving liberty interests, must undertake these types of cases if
the profession is to discharge its mandate to protect and preserve
democratic values. At least, that is the way Laswell and
44. Id. at 208.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., John Yoo, War, Responsibility, and the Age of Terrorism, 57
STAN. L. REV. 793, 793–95 (2004); see also ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY
TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE
CHALLENGE (Yale University Press 2002).
47. Raphael G. Satter, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Scalia Says “SoCalled Torture” Cannot Be Ruled Out, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 12, 2008),
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23153116/ns/world_newsterrorism/t/scalia-so-called-torture-cannot-be-ruled-out/#.UDYmGOe5dM.
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McDougal saw it as they assigned a special responsibility to law
schools: “The proper function of our law schools is, in short, to
contribute to the training of policy-makers for the ever more
complete achievement of the democratic values that constitute the
professed ends of American polity.” 48
Implicit in this call for the instilling of “democratic values”
are the larger questions of what the outer reaches of those values
are, and what the “ends” of the American polity are, or should be.
The strident and intractable temper of current political debate is
but one barometer measuring the divergence of opinion on issues
that twenty years ago were considered resolved, at least in theory.
Among these issues are abortion, birth control, gender pay parity,
separation of church and state, racial profiling, etc. Most law
schools will undoubtedly draw their students from across the
political and ideological spectrum just as they attract a fair
grouping of those who simply want a license to enter what they
understand to be a trade, albeit a sophisticated one.This will not
be an easy task. Crafting a mission and a curriculum that
represents “democratic values” designed to address and reform
contemporary societal problems through the agency of Kronman’s
statesmen or Laswell and McDougal’s policy-makers will require a
law school to first clarify its own mission and then to marshal
some backbone and self-confidence to push it. Complicating this
task is the central tenet of the adversarial system which holds
that everyone is entitled to legal representation; and thus lawyers
are obliged to represent snakes as well as saints and every grade
of goodness and evil in between. So the persistent question
remains: what type of legal education fits all (or most)?
Laswell and McDougal ventured an answer that attempts to
mesh the law school’s desire to inculcate into its students a
commitment to ethical conduct in the pursuit of democratic values
with a respect for the sensibilities of the individual student:
In a democratic society it should not, of course, be an aim of
legal education to impose a single standard of morals upon every
student. But a legitimate aim of education is to seek to promote
the major values of a democratic society and to reduce the number
of moral mavericks who do not share democratic preferences. The
student may be allowed to reject the morals of democracy and
48.

Laswell & McDougal, supra note 42, at 206.
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embrace those of despotism; but his education should be such that,
if he does so, he does it by deliberate choice, with awareness of the
consequences for himself and others, and not by sluggish selfdeception.49
Law schools are clearly under no obligation to design a
curriculum that provides instructions on how to conceal police
brutality, send blacks to the back of the bus, and deny full
participation in civic life to all but those who can prove their
heterosexuality. Noxious ideas that may be freely espoused in the
town park have no place in law school. That people who engage in
racist or homophobic behavior are entitled to a defense if they are
charged with a violation of the law does not translate into an
affirmative duty to teach their odious doctrines in law school, or
any other school for that matter.
I reference these extreme situations not because a significant
population of law school administrators wishes to promote antidemocratic values but because law students reflect the larger
polity from which they are drawn; and thus, there is no assurance
that they are universally or unwaveringly committed to
democratic values and social justice. How could they all be if some
spring from the same soil that has given us the racist,
homophobic, and xenophobic blather mouthed daily by countless
elected officials and talk show hosts in every section of the
country? Yet Laswell and McDougal sensibly argue that while the
curriculum need not adjust to the undemocratic sentiments of any
student or group of students, such students should neither be
expelled nor penalized for chafing at the law school’s promotion of
democratic values.
A law school’s promotion of values as advocated by Laswell
and McDougal, Kronman, and the authors of the Carnegie Report,
may appear counterintuitive to the vaunted principle of academic
neutrality, that is, the professor in a given course supplies the
scholarly information with a survey of responsible critiques and
then lets the student come to her own conclusions. Here is what
Dickens wrote, here are the times he lived in, here is what
reputable critics have said, now you decide. This approach may
suffice when discussing the Romantic poets or even the black
letter laws of offer and acceptance or libel and slander, but a
49.

Laswell & McDougal, supra note 42, at 212.
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different dynamic operates if the questions are, for example,
whether legal services should be available for those facing
deportation, whether detainees should be held indefinitely without
trial, or whether gays should be permitted to marry. Could a law
school seeking to produce graduates ready and eager to serve the
public interest in a purportedly democratic society fairly answer
these questions in the negative or positive?
Such tensions as those that exist between academic neutrality
and the advocacy of democratic values are surely intensified by
the adversarial system and its premise that all sides to a dispute
are entitled to be heard. However, this still begs the question of a
lawyer’s responsibility regarding the kind and quality of
representation he or she is obliged to provide. There is, after all, a
qualitative difference between vigorously defending a person
accused of war crimes and affirmatively assisting a client, even a
president, in circumventing, if not obliterating, the strictures of
the Geneva Conventions and other laws, domestic and
international, which proscribe torture.50
Similarly, while it is perfectly acceptable for an attorney to
represent management’s interests in a labor dispute, is it ethically
acceptable for the attorney to design a strategy for an employer to
undermine workers’ rights and intentionally consign employees to
unsafe conditions at the minimum wage, albeit a lawful one? And
was it morally proper for one of the most prominent former
constitutional law professor in the country to direct his advocates
to argue to the United States Supreme Court that the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit strip searches of misdemeanor
arrestees without any probable cause or reasonable suspicion
whatsoever indicating they might be in possession of contraband
or weapons? 51
The consensus at any bar association meeting or judicial
conference respecting a lawyer’s responsibilities regarding
representation of either side in any of these scenarios would
undoubtedly be that the lawyer may do virtually anything to
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd (2006) (codifying the United Nations
Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman, and
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which became effective December 10,
1984).
51. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington, 132
S.Ct. 1510 (2012).
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further the client’s objectives so long as no fraud or lying is
involved and legal justifications are in the realm of the plausible.
So long as the adversarial system remains governed by such
guidelines as those found in Rule 11, 52 no change in this dominant
viewpoint is likely. However, this does not obligate the law schools
to follow suit.
As the gatekeepers for those who wish to enter the profession,
the schools are ideally positioned to shape the character and
professionalism of lawyers so they will not shirk from redirecting
their clients away from a socially destructive path, even if the law
could be used to justify it. Just as the ethical divorce lawyer will
not help a hurt and furious spouse avoid child support payments
or frustrate visitation rights, even if the marriage partner was a
scoundrel and cheater but a decent parent nonetheless, shouldn’t
lawyers put the brakes on polluters and usurers even if
responsible conduct diminishes the profit margin?
That problems of morale, competency, and ethics, not to
mention angst about income potential on the part of recent law
school graduates, permeate the legal profession is beyond cavil.
The New York Times has regularly chronicled these phenomena
and the malaise they engender for the past several years. 53 It is
small consolation that every other political and social institution
in the United States is failing or faltering when measured against
some past ideal, real or fanciful. Some of these failing political
institutions include: political gridlock in Washington and
elsewhere; a costly and cumbersome health care system; shooting
wars on many fronts; chronic poverty for millions and a persistent
societal inability to more equitably distribute the boons of record52. Rule 11 provides, in pertinent part: “ . . . By presenting to the court a
pleading, written motion, or other paper . . . an attorney . . . certifies that to
the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief . . . the claims,
defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or
for establishing new law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
53. See James B. Stewart, Dewey’s Fall Underscores Law Firms’ New
Reality, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2012, at B1; Peter Lattman, Dewey & LeBoeuf
Crisis Mirrors the Legal Industry’s Woes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2012, at B7;
David Segal, What They Don’t Teach Law Students: Lawyering, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 20, 2011, at A1; David Segal, Law School Economics: Ka-Ching!, N.Y.
TIMES, July 17, 2011, at BU1; David Segal, Behind the Curve, N.Y. TIMES,
May 1, 2011, at BU1.
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high corporate profits; decayed and decaying infrastructure; and
elementary and secondary schools, and colleges and universities,
providing educations that many responsible critics say are
inadequate.
Given the intelligent, problem-solving, and even aggressive,
personality imbedded in many of those attracted to the law as a
career, it should come as no surprise that some of these people
have resolved to fix the problems besetting the profession; and
some within this hardy group have resolved to do this by
reforming law schools. Although the profession’s difficulties are
complex, ill-defined, and generally difficult to study and quantify
in the field, i.e., places such as the courtroom and the lawyer’s
office, this is not viewed as an obstacle by these intrepid
reformers. Some of these critics and reformers, it must be said,
find no worth in any current law school curriculum, as if the
overwhelming majority of graduates cannot distinguish the
hearsay rule from res ipsa loquitur. 54
Though the Carnegie Report has its shortcomings and often
replows the field, it should not be ignored or dismissed. On the
contrary, the discussions it stimulats and actions it provokes will
continue to help law schools evaluate and improve their services.
And these discussions have taken place not only within individual
law schools but across the spectrum of legal education.
A consortium of ten law schools called the Legal Education
Analysis and Reform Network (LEARN) 55 was formed in 2009
with the express goal of working together to solidfy, for their
students, some of the reforms the Carnegie Report recommended.
Their self-appointed mission, 56 in sum, is to “promote thoughtful
innovation” in law schools’ curricula by teaching a variety of
54. See, e.g., Ethan Bonner, A Call for Drastic Changes in Educating
New Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2013, at A11.
55. The LEARN consortium consists of the following participating
schools: CUNY Law School, Georgetown University Law Center, Harvard
Law School, Indiana University School of Law (Bloomington), New York
University School of Law, Southwestern Law School, Stanford Law School,
University of Dayton School of Law, University of New Mexico Law School,
and Vanderbilt University Law School. See LEARN Proposal, supra note 15,
at 5.
56. LEARN has not to date published or announced a definitive mission
statement that could be referenced here, however, their primary objectives
are set forth in contents of the LEARN Proposal. See LEARN Proposal, supra
note 15.
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subjects in an array of practical learning environments, exploring
the best ways to transmit the recommendations of the Carnegie
Report to law school faculty members, and to examine the role
that assessment plays in legal education. Thus far, individual
schools with and without LEARN have engaged in these and
related undertakings, but how much of this activity is attributable
to impetus from the consortium remains to be seem. 57
IV. DEVELOPING RELEVANT—AND REMEDIAL—
PERSPECTIVES COURSES

If there is a solitary law school somewhere that does not offer
one or two credit courses that deviate in mode of presentation and
subject matter from the core doctrinal and bar preparatory
courses taught by the lecture and case method, I have not located
it. On the contrary, a random examination of law school curricula
shows a plethora of topics covered by seminars, sometimes aptly
named Perspectives Courses, which have as their goal the
introduction of legal issues and viewpoints not usually addressed
in the principal courses. Every law school is offering these
courses, mostly to second and third year students. As would be
expected, the larger (and more prosperous) the law school, the
greater the variety of courses offered. Many of the titles suggest
that seminars are often presented not only to educate, but to
entertain and divert—not, to borrow from Jerry Seinfeld, that
there is anything wrong with that.
The randomness of the topics coupled with an absolute
discretion allowing the student to select any seminar she wants
from the buffet put in front of her does not necessarily serve the
student well when the goal is to increase professional competence.
A law school could hardly be considered tyrannical, or even
overbearing, if it mandated some Perspectives Courses to be taken
in conjunction with, or as prerequisites to, certain clinical courses.
Some law schools now already provide counseling for a student to
follow a particular track in the second or third year if the student
has discovered a field of possible specialization. The law school
would be meeting its obligation to the student and the legal
profession if it paired a seminar with the student’s practical
57. See id. at 10–11 (describing the three working groups that have been
established to effectuate LEARN’s planned projects).
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interests as revealed by her choice of a clinical course.
To facilitate this I suggest that some of the perspectives
courses be grouped under three rubrics:
History,58 Legal
Profession and Social Issues, and Doctrinal. Not every seminar
will fit neatly into these categories, and any seminar could surely
be taken by a student without any connection to a clinical course.
Some subjects would necessarily be placed under two, perhaps
all three, of the rubrics; this should be no surprise as unearthing
the law is at bottom a historical investigation into precedent, past
legislative intent, and the evolution of public policy. For instance,
one possible complement to a clinic in criminal defense would be a
seminar in the History of the Fourth Amendment, beginning
perhaps with the trials and travail of John Wilkes in eighteenth
century England,59 the fulminations of James Otis, 60 and/or
Stephen Hopkins 61 against the predations of King George III and
his colonial officers on the eve of the American Revolution; but
when these matters are measured against contemporary United
States Supreme Court decisions in, say, Whren v. United States 62
and Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 63 the domain of the
Doctrinal will have been entered.
The rubric of Legal Profession and Social Issues presents a
litany of topics, almost all with some historical or doctrinal
content, or both; and some of these could easily be matched with a
relevant clinic. In addition to the wider philosophical questions of
to whom and to what the attorney and the profession are
responsible, the daily ethical quandaries a lawyer experiences—
i.e., cross-examining to discredit a witness the lawyer knows is
telling the truth; assisting the client to conform his recollection to
what forensic evidence shows to the contrary; deciding how much
58. For a vigorous argument urging the teaching of history to law
students, See Harold P. Southerland, The Case for American History in the
Law-School Curriculum, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 661 (2007).
59. See ARTHUR H. CASH, JOHN WILKES: THE SCANDALOUS FATHER OF
CIVIL LIBERTY (Yale University Press 2006).
60. James Otis famously decried the general warrant as “[T]he worst
instrument of arbitrary power . . . that ever was found in an English law
book,” a declaration admiringly cited by the United States Supreme Court in
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886).
61. Stephen Hopkins, The Rights of Colonies Examined (1764) (reprinted
by The Rhode Island Bicentennial Foundation: Providence 1974).
62. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
63. 132 S.Ct. 1510 (2012).
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adverse legal research to provide against one’s own thesis;
counseling the criminal defendant about taking the witness stand,
etc.—would all be apt explorations in any seminar complementing
clinics that expose the student to trial preparation and practice.
The same could be said for a seminar focusing on the use of
the media by lawyers to advance the cause of their client(s). In
today’s technological age, it is not unusual for a lawyer to be
thrust by an aggressive media and the public declarations of one’s
adversary into a controversy in which a grasp of both public
relations and ethical considerations are crucial. There are also
circumstances that warrant the attorney initiating contact with
the media, as when an activist organization is about to commence
litigation addressing what they believe to be official
transgressions. And there are numerous related topics as well,
with which the attorney, as a leader in the community, should be
conversant.
These issues invariably surface if the attorney is speaking
about the profession to a student group or civic organization. Is it
good and healthy that Justices Scalia and Breyer are regulars on
talk shows, often discussing books they have written? Are the
“judges” on daytime reality shows real judges, and should some of
them have their tickets pulled for routinely bringing discredit on
the profession by unnecessarily upbraiding, insulting and
demeaning the benighted souls who appear before them in ways
that would make the nineteenth century judges in the somber and
stern portraits lining courthouse walls seem like therapists on an
Oprah show? A seminar that explores these topics could also
address the issue of judicial free speech as well. 64 Clearly, the
aspiring lawyers will not be functioning as judges in any clinics,
but the subject of judicial speech is one with which a member of
the profession should be familiar.
Some perspectives courses will have aspects of all three
rubrics. This is certainly the case, for example, with an academic
excursion into the social and legal historyof gay rights designed to
64. See, e.g., Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002); See also
The Code of Conduct for United States Judges, available at http:/
www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/CodesOfConduct/CodeConductUnited
StatesJudges.aspx; Stephen J. Fortunato, Jr., On a Judge’s Duty to Speak
Extrajudicially: Rethinking the Strategy of Silence, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
679 (1999).
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better prepare students who work in clinics focusing on the rights
of individuals in the LGBT community. As is the case with many
topics, the professor, full-time or adjunct, chosen to lead such a
seminar will benefit from considerable historical spadework
already done in this field; a stroll through the stacks of law
reviews in an accredited law library or a visit to the law section in
a decent bookstore—brick and mortar or Internet—will attest to
this.
More than ten years ago, journalists Joyce Murdoch and Deb
Price chronicled the legal struggles waged during the twentieth
century to strike down laws discriminating against, even
criminalizing, gay and lesbian individuals in Courting Justice:
Gay Men and Lesbians v. the Supreme Court. 65 More recently,
Professor Dale Carpenter of the University of Minnesota Law
School has written in a popular style, Flagrant Conduct: The Story
of Lawrence v. Texas, 66 which shows a legal and cultural history
complete with the strategizing and tactical maneuvering of the
lawyers and activists involved.
While the focal point of Flagrant Conduct is the constitutional
challenge to a Texas sodomy statute, the book, like any seminar
that uses it, can serve as an instructional device that goes well
beyond the issue of gay rights. The same can be said for the words
Justice Anthony Kennedy used to identify the animating principle
of his decision, reversing what the Court had said was dogma only
seventeen years before in Bowers v. Hardwick. 67 Recasting Chief
Justice John Marshall’s immortal declaration from McCullough v.
Maryland, 68 Justice Kennedy wrote: “As the Constitution endures,
persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own
search for greater freedom.” 69
Thus, a perspectives course created primarily to provide a
substantive historical and doctrinal background for students who
have elected to work in a clinic providing legal assistance to the
LGBT community also may create opportunities to acquaint them
65. JOYCE MURDOCK & DEB PRICE, COURTING JUSTICE: GAY MEN AND
LESBIANS V. THE SUPREME COURT (Basic Books 2001).
66. DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE V.
TEXAS (2012).
67. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
68. McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407, 415 (1819) (“[I]t is a
constitution we are expounding . . . intended for ages to come . . . ”).
69. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003).
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with the dynamic view of constitutional interpretation that will
serve them well when they need to explore strategy and tactics in
legal disputes beyond the topic of the seminar.
The diversity of Perspectives courses will be as wide and
adventurous as the imagination of the law school’s faculty and the
governing entity that approves the curriculum; and this is true not
just for seminars addressing controversial social issues but
traditional doctrinal concerns as well. The latter will most
naturally arise to address a peeve of a professor regarding a
confusion some point of doctrine may present to students, either
because it is inherently complex or because the course in which
the student initially meets it gives it short shrift because of the
volume of other topics obliged to be covered.
During my time as attorney, judge, and professor, I have
observed gaps, if not chasms, in the understanding by lawyers,
both young and seasoned, of some fundamental doctrines; and I
attribute much of this to the cursory approach to these topics in
law school.
Leading my list of peeves is the dearth of
understanding by lawyers, and hence many judges, of the concepts
of burden of proof and the burden of producing evidence. While a
course in criminal law will reference proof “beyond a reasonable
doubt” and torts will invariably touch upon proof by “a fair
preponderance of the evidence,” the invocation of catch phrases
without an in depth exploration 70 will hardly prepare the student
for recognizing what evidentiary hurdles must be surmounted at
trial or how to craft a jury instruction most favorable to one’s
client. Add to these two prevalent standards, the standards of
“scintilla of evidence,” “prima facie case,” “substantial evidence”
(especially as used in administrative settings), and “clear and
convincing evidence” and one has more than ample fodder for a
doctrinal Perspectives seminar just on Burdens of Proof.
Fortunately, the United States Supreme Court over the years
has provided considerable instruction on this topic, though, sadly,
it has been ignored more than followed. In the criminal law we
have been instructed that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that
70. An epigram of Oliver Wendell Holmes neatly summarizes the
problem: “It is one of the misfortunes of the law that ideas become encysted
in phrases and thereafter for a long time cease to provoke further analysis.”
Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 391 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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credible and persuasive evidence which induces in the fact finder
a “subjective state of near certitude.” 71 Similar guidance has been
provided for civil litigation. 72 Seminars addressing burdens of
proof and other evidentiary issues, such as Rule 404(b) of the
Rules of Evidence, in a thorough manner are more than academic
exercises because any misunderstanding leading to their
misapplication can have dire consequences for litigants.
The former Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, Jon Newman, has argued that the
pervasive misunderstanding of the criminal burden of proof by
federal judges has led to the conviction of many people on a
standard less than that constitutionally mandated. 73 His thesis
was straightforward: “I believe that the constitutional
jurisprudence of this Nation has accepted the ‘reasonable doubt’
standard as a verbal formulation to be conveyed to juries in jury
charges but has failed to take the standard as a rule of law
against which the validity of convictions is to be judged.” 74
A last example involving History and Social Issues, with cases
scattered over decades available for illustration, is the muchdiscussed political question of judicial activism. It is one of many
topics that students should be familiar with if they are to protect
not just the rights and interests of their own clients but also the
integrity of the profession.
Though the topic surfaces in presidential campaigns and
senate confirmation hearings, the public remains without a sound
understanding of what courts do and how judges decide cases
involving matters of policy and public interest. Judges and
attorneys must take responsibility for this failure to educate the
average voter as they have either ignored the debate altogether or
have been timorous when venturing into it.
The law is replete with pronouncements by eminent legal
thinkers that judges, in fact, make law. However, Chief Justice
71. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979); See also In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 254 (1910);
Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 456 (1895).
72. See, e.g., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Greenwich Collieries,
512 U.S. 267 (1994); Concrete Pipe and Products of Cal. v. Construction
Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602 (1993).
73. Jon O. Newman, Beyond “Reasonable Doubt,” 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979,
980 (1993).
74. Id.
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John Roberts’s analogy at his confirmation hearing of a judge’s
role to that of a baseball umpire calling strikes and balls has
carried the day in the public imagination. While the turning of
the words “judicial activism” into a badge of infamy was a
Republican stratagem, the Democrats conceded the debate to their
opponents, and today all judges flee from the epithet. This fosters
a popular view of the courts that is not supported by history. A
few references will illustrate my point.
Justice Benjamin Cardozo in his classic The Nature of the
Judicial Process titled a section covering easily a fourth of his
tract ‘The Judge as Legislator’ to explain his assertion that a
judge “fills the open spaces in the law.” 75 Oliver Wendell Holmes
favored us with this concise observation: “I recognize without
hesitation that judges must and do legislate.” 76 And to these we
can add the words of Judge Jerome Frank who maintained that
those who wished for a just and humane legal system must face
the unavoidable uncertainties in law.77 More recently, the late
esteemed federal judge, Gerhard A. Gesell, who presided over the
trial of Oliver North, told a gathering of lawyers and law students:
“There is. . .not much precedent out there, and, frankly, precedent
is frequently confused and goes both ways.” 78
These jurists undoubtedly respected the Constitution and the
Founders. However, it is not difficult to locate in their careers a
repeated endorsement of the need to make the law relevant to
contemporary circumstances that our eighteenth century
predecessors, some of them slave owners and all of them
champions of a limited franchise, could not have imagined. I offer
the judicial activism controversy as an example of an undermining
of the rule of law that is as insidious as the attacks that criticize
personal injury lawyers, and not errant hospitals or physicians, or
the manufacturers of defective products, for driving consumer
prices up. If the law schools are to heed the call of the Carnegie
Report and others to inculcate a commitment to professional
75. CARDOZO, supra note 8, at 118.
76. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917).
77. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 7 (1930) (“Much of
the uncertainty of law is not an unfortunate accident: it is of immense social
value.”).
78. Edward N. Beiser, Perspectives on the Judiciary, 39 AM. U. L. REV.
475, 511 (1990) (Gerhard A. Gesell interview).
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responsibility in their students, part of which is to explain the role
of the legal system to the public, then such topics must be
addressed and the background and history of the controversies
and the biases of the contending disputants must be exposed and
scrutinized.
V. CONCLUSION

Law schools as a group, albeit not a cohesive one, have for
some years been offering students clinical programs and seminars
as a supplement to the core doctrinal curriculum. An examination
of the efficacy of these endeavors and soul-searching as to how to
improve them has been underway at least since the publication of
the Carnegie Report in 2007. A random survey of law school
catalogues, now available almost exclusively on the Internet,
shows that clinical programs and seminars of every imaginable
variety are offered in one quantity or another at all of the nation’s
law schools. How well this cornucopia is preparing the next
generation of attorneys to function in a competent, ethical, and
socially useful manner remains to be seen.
To maximize the possibility that some benefit of these
supplemental programs will inure to both the individual lawyer
and the larger society, it is incumbent upon the law schools to
recognize the unfortunate deficit in the humanities the students
are bringing to the schools; and it is also crucial that the schools
determine what it is in addition to basic legal knowledge they
should to impart to their students. The answer to this question
supplied by the Carnegie Report (in its broadest terms) and other
commentators is a sense of ethical responsibility by lawyers to
their clients, the judicial system, and the wider community.
The Carnegie Report and its criticisms about the legal
profession and legal education had distinguished precursors in
Dean Anthony Kronman with his call for lawyers to be statesmen
and Professors Meyers McDougal and Harold Laswell insisting
that law schools be mindful that lawyers are policy-makers with a
responsibility to maintain and expand democratic values.
While esoteric and entertaining Perspectives courses have
their place, the suggestion of this essay is that schools design
some of their seminars to relate directly to the practical clinics
being offered. I propose three rubrics toward this end: History,
Legal Profession and Social Issues, and Doctrinal. This is hardly
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an exhaustive list, but within the ones I suggest, ample
opportunities will be available for the student to encounter an indepth exposure to the history and literature in the topic being
addressed by a complimentary clinic or core course. This will give
the student a more comprehensive grasp of the subject at hand
while providing the ancillary benefit of remedying the humanities
deficit so prevalent among most college graduates.
I have advocated that some of these seminars be required as
supplements to, or prerequisites for, certain core courses or clinics.
If such a mandate for second and third year students runs counter
to the culture at a given school, then the student can be strongly
urged to enroll in the complimentary perspectives course.
Though to assess any causal nexus between law school
performance and superlative and ethically responsible lawyering
is difficult, it is not a stretch to say that providing students a
background in the history and philosophy of a legal issue, be it the
Fourth Amendment or eminent domain or anything else, will
measurably increase their efficacy as advocates and community
leaders, whether the audience is an appellate court, the readers of
an editorial, or a political or civic group.

